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WHAT SHOULD LAWYERS DO?: AN ESSAY ON
LAWYERS, THE FREE ECONOMY,
REDISTRIBUTION, AND DEMOCRATIC
LEGITIMACY
JAMES P. BECKWITH, JR.*
What should lawyers do? The conventional wisdom is, of course, that
the lawyer is a relatively value-free "hired gun" helping achieve whatever
lawful ends the client desires. However, the recent controversies sur-
rounding personal injury liability, the Legal Services Corporation, the
role of history in constitutional adjudication, and Critical Legal Studies
have reopened the debate concerning the lawyer's role and raise some
fundamental questions about what clients demand, what lawyers do, and
how lawyers are educated. This essay explores the extent to which
wealth redistribution as opposed to wealth creation has come to influence
our legal culture and shows that most participants in this culture,
whether clients, lawyers, judges, or law professors, have been influenced
by this trend.
Part I discusses the importance of three assumptions about the modern
world: the inevitability of ignorance and the limitations of the human
intellect; the inevitability of our fallen human nature; and the importance
of prudential judgment in approaching the problem of suffering. Part II
evaluates the demands of clients from the perspective of redistribution.
Part III examines the inclinations of lawyers toward redistribution, and
Part IV examines the impact of redistribution on constitutional law.
Part V discusses the influence of redistribution on the law schools. The
essay concludes with a call for renewal.
I. THE MODERN SETTING
Before proceeding further, I should make explicit three important as-
sumptions. The first assumption focuses on what has been called the cal-
culation problem and asks whether the use of knowledge in society
* Professor of Law, North Carolina Central University; B.A., University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill; J.D., University of Chicago. Portions of this paper were presented before the Mont
Pelerin Society at its West Berlin meeting when the author was an Olive W. Garvey Fellow. Other
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Lundy Chair of the Philosophy of Business. He also wishes to thank James Bond, Thomas
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draft.
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exceeds the capacity of our minds to know. The second assumption con-
cerns human nature. Are we inherently good or even malleable, or are we
prone to sin and self-interest? Can institutional arrangements lead us to
the good? Thirdly, how should we respond to suffering? In an imperfect
world how do we make difficult choices involving scarcity and pain?
The first question centers on how we are to plan for and live our lives.
It is not a question of whether planning will take place. It is a question
of how, and we must begin with humility and recognize our own inevita-
ble ignorance. Burdened by our own imperfect intellects, the choice is
between planning by a dispersed, decentralized means such as the market
as opposed to planning by a centralized means such as government.
Which means works better?
As Professor Hayek and others' have shown, the free economy is the
only mechanism capable of coordinating vast amounts of widely dis-
persed information that transcend the capacity of any individual mind to
comprehend. We will never know enough to do without money prices.
Indeed, the more complex a society becomes, the more essential decen-
tralized mechanisms become and the more futile any attempt at central-
ized planning. As a result of this decentralized, spontaneous
coordination by the price system, value-maximizing exchanges give rise
to orderly structures that are the result of human action but not of
human design.
The market is not only the sole mechanism capable of decentralized
planning, but is the only means by which wealth can be created and liv-
ing standards raised. The free economy is relatively youthful, and back
beyond the eighteenth century one finds only the grim reality of static
subsistence economies. As T. S. Ashton2 and R. M. Hartwell3 have
shown, the Industrial Revolution was an enormous leap forward from
the degradation of medieval life. Perhaps the most extraordinary exam-
ple of this process occurred in England where for the first time wealth
increased at a faster rate than did population. The Industrial Revolution
brought about a consumer revolution where cheaper goods were avail-
able for widespread use. Sanitation improved, infant mortality fell, and
life expectancies increased. Why in England at that tiine? Largely be-
cause the legal guarantees of the common law and the flexible social and
cultural system of the time inhibited redistribution, encouraged risk-tak-
ing, and fostered the release of an enormous amount of creative energy.
The lawyer's role generally was benign because the state intruded so in-
frequently. The typical nineteenth-century Englishman could be born,
1. T. SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS (1980); Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Soci-
ety, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).
2. T. S. ASHTON, THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 1760-1830 (1964).
3. R. M. HARTWELL, THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1971); see
also INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, THE LONG DEBATE ON POVERTY (1974).
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live, and die without having much contact with the state, or with law-
yers, for that matter.
From the vantage point of a secure, sanitary, and prosperous society,
the historical lessons of the past 200 years are forgotten all too quickly.
The idea of progress, being relative, is not compared to a forgotten past.
In lamenting the inequality of wealth, many ignore universal, medieval
misery. In a concern over long-term degenerative diseases allegedly
caused by the environmental impact of the mature market system, many
forget that in pre-industrial society few people lived long enough to de-
velop such diseases. They further forget that in our own time life expec-
tancies continue to lengthen. In warning of the imminent exhaustion of
resources, many forget that technology is not static, that the market is
flexible and responsive to change, and that experience has disproved re-
peatedly these dire predictions. Only an awareness of history can over-
come the unstated premise upon which these criticisms rest: the naive
assumption that wealth is an everpresent fixed quantity to be redis-
tributed rather than an expandable, enriching presence dependent upon
and limited only by saving, capital investment, and human ingenuity.
In our own time the wealth-creating capacity of the market is richly
apparent. The mature market societies enjoy the highest standard of liv-
ing ever achieved for the greatest number. The fruits of the market
adorn North America, Western Europe, Japan, and Australia. In the
socialist countries, deprivation and tyranny stretch from Eastern Europe
to Africa, China, and Southeast Asia. Given the impossibilty of central
planning, queues are everpresent and shortages inevitable. The familiar
empty shelves typical of Marxist economies and the self-imposed misery
of countries like Tanzania and Uganda bear eloquent testimony to the
failure of socialism. Indeed, the market's virtues, being in accord with
the natural tendency of human nature to maximize self-interest, are so
durable that in many such countries productivity can be found only on
the black market, such as in Burma or Vietnam, or in the surviving pri-
vate sector, such as the tiny private plots in the Soviet Union that pro-
duce much of its food.
At present a new chapter in this familiar story is being written as de-
veloping countries that have turned toward a free economy experience
real economic growth. All along the Pacific Rim, for example, living
standards are rising. Hong Kong, a tiny enclave bereft of natural re-
sources, by the use of the market and human ingenuity, has become the
entrepreneurial hub of Asia. Taiwan, Malaysia, South Korea, and Singa-
pore have grown richer while nearby countries that have repudiated the
market stagnate. Equally compelling examples are those formerly social-
ist countries that have in varying degrees embraced the market after bit-
ter experience. In Chile and Sri Lanka living standards are rising in
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contrast with trends as recent as a decade ago. Even in Communist
China, the importance of market incentives is being recognized, albeit
hesitantly.
Given its grounding in the subjective decisions of consumers, the mar-
ket is acutely sensitive and responsive to individual preferences, fostering
enormous diversity of choice. This wider spectrum of choice is particu-
larly important in a pluralistic society because the free economy provides
opportunity for, and ameliorates prejudice against, racial and religious
minorities.4
The virtues of the free economy extend far beyond the creation of
wealth, however. Indeed, the more compelling justification for the free
economy is a moral one and resides in the market's fostering of the lib-
erty of the individual and its links to the timeless norms that undergird
Judeo-Christian civilization.
Liberty reflects the extent of coercion of the individual and differs
markedly from democracy. Democracy is a method for the attainment
of liberty and is not necessarily a guarantor of its survival because of
structural defects. By contrast, political liberty is fostered by the free
economy, which disperses power in a manner reminiscent of the original
intent of the American Constitution. Just as federalism and the separa-
tion of powers enhance the freedom of individuals, scattered independent
actors who are free to pursue their own subjective preferences enjoy a
greatly heightened personal autonomy. The related institutions of pri-
vate property, free transferability, open competition, and freedom of con-
tract further insulate the individual from arbitrary concentrations of
power.
As economic liberty contracts, so does political freedom. Indeed,
political freedom can never long survive the establishment of a govern-
mental monopoly of economic power. The dismal track record of the
socialist countries graphically portrays the inevitable loss of individual
freedom that follows socialization of an economy. In the so-called social
democracies, the decline in freedom is a gradual process. In countries
lacking a strong democratic tradition, socialism usually begets an extinc-
tion of whatever political liberty existed previously. The abolition of the
market also contributes to the decline of intellectual freedom. The recent
struggle of the Daily Gleaner in Jamaica during the regime of Michael
Manley, the interregnum of the Grenadian Voice, and the present strug-
gle of La Prensa in Nicaragua aptly demonstrate the ephemeral nature of
intellectual freedom in the absence of a free economy.
Admittedly, economic liberty is a necessary condition for personal
freedom but is not a sufficient one. Even so, the free economy mitigates
4. T. SOWELL, MARKETS AND MINORMES (1981); T. SOWELL, RACE AND ECONOMICS
(1975); W. WILLIAMS, THE STATE AGAINST BLACKS (1982).
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the concentration of political power in authoritarian countries and gener-
ates a rising standard of living. By contrast, in the totalitarian countries
where the government enjoys both an economic and political monopoly
aimed at total control, the individual enjoys no protected spheres from
the state. Ironically, the relative freedom of market-oriented authorita-
rian countries enables the critics of the market order to portray the short-
comings of those countries with relative ease while virtually no
information escapes the socialist, totalitarian states. As a result, virtue
rarely is associated with the market because of the inevitable silence re-
garding the evils of non-market states.
The duality of economic and political liberty reinforces the moral justi-
fication for the free economy. To argue solely that the free economy
creates wealth is never sufficient because such an approach offers no vi-
sion of a just society. Very few people commit themselves to institutions
that they do not believe to be morally deserving. The great strength of
the market resides in its being materially enriching while enjoying an
ethical basis that in practice is superior to non-market alternatives. The
practice of the free economy creates wealth, which encourages our gener-
osity and charity, not because of governmentally coerced redistribution,
but because of the judgment of the giver. The market encourages toler-
ance by imposing the costs of discrimination on those who would dis-
criminate where value-maximizing exchange could otherwise take place.
Because the subjective preferences of consumers are the source of value,
the market fosters a regard for others. Honesty, thrift, and deferred grat-
ification are rewarded by private markets. The free economy also gives
the greatest opportunities for the free exercise of religion because of the
market's enhancement of all private spheres of action. What seems mate-
rialistic on the surface can nourish deeply held norms.
The market economy does not, however, create equalities of wealth.
While equality before the law is essential, equality of condition is unat-
tainable, and attempts to achieve equality of wealth create disastrous
negative incentives that reduce the wealth of society. More importantly,
the legally enforced reduction of income differences emerging from vol-
untary arrangements intensifies the inequality of political power.' Coer-
cion must be used because people differ, enjoying the "boundless variety
of human nature. . . the wide range of differences in individual capaci-
ties and potentialities [that] is one of the most distinctive facts about the
human species." 6 Among these differential aptitudes, one of the most
important is that of entrepreneurial anticipation of market changes. The
entrepreneur is the discoverer who perceives opportunities for wealth
5. Bauer, Egalitarianism: Art of the Impossible, in Two ESSAYS ON INCOME DISTRIBUTION
AND THE OPEN SOCIETY 9, 10 (Int'l Inst. Econ.-Research 1977).
6. F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 86 (1962).
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creation. These opportunities are available for all but are perceived and
acted upon by only a few. People also differ in their attitudes toward
wealth creation. As noted by Edward Banfield in his skillful analysis of
time horizons, wealth creation is associated with saving and a preference
for deferred gratification over present consumption.7 Finally, consumers
with their varying tastes are notoriously fickle as to whom they will re-
ward with their favor.
In sum, the inequality of income is the inescapable byproduct of a free
society because of this greater industry, unequal endowment of the rare
gift of entrepreneurship, differing attitudes toward saving and consump-
tion, and differential rewards from satisfied consumers. These unequal
rewards for initiative are morally just and cannot ethically be con-
demned. Even so, with open, competitive markets maximizing wealth
for the entire society, dissatisfaction is excited by a sense of relative dep-
rivation. Mindful of this, politicians adeptly use envy as a means for
gaining the support of voters. Envy is perhaps the most corrosive influ-
ence in our civic culture. The persecution of productive trading and
banking minorities such as European Jewry and the Chinese of Southeast
Asia is a grim reminder of this tendency.
The second preliminary question already has been alluded to: the at-
tributes of our human nature. Are we inherently good and capable of
unlimited improvement in the proper environment? Or are we inherently
less than good, led by sin, self-interest or a combination of these things to
try to live at the expense of others if given the chance?
I am not an optimist nor do I entertain romantic notions of the per-
fectibility of persons. My view is derived from eighteenth-century repub-
licanism, the viewpoint of the American founders, which is consistent
with the insights of both the religious community and the economists.
Guided by sin and self-interest, we do err, and virtue arises less by exhor-
tation than by realistic institutional arrangements that take into account
our natural tendencies. These tendencies can be channeled but not re-
formed, harnassed but not transformed. Redemption is by grace, not of
this world. This possibility of our knowing ourselves does not contradict
the idea that we do not know enough to solve the calculation problem.
That our intellects allow us to observe and intuit our faults does not
qualify us to presume that we can do without money prices to coordinate
our economic arrangements.
Finally, before we turn our attention to lawyers and their clients, what
is to be done about suffering? Before we began to take affluence for
granted, suffering was our constant companion. Its familiarity bred stoi-
cism and acceptance and strengthened religious faith in the hereafter.
7. E. BANFIELD, THE UNHEAVENLY CITY REVISITED 52-76 (1974).
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Now we no longer accept its inevitability. The conquest of suffering has
made its lingering remnants even more unacceptable, and to some,
intolerable.
Suffering and pain are not to be relished, and charity and compassion
are laudable virtues. However, an impatience with suffering carries its
own risks, especially the possibilty that purported public remedies will
create more suffering than originally existed to be ameliorated. Good in-
tentions must be tempered with a realistic appraisal of the unintended
consequences of human action. The most shockingly vulnerable example
of this failure is seen today as a result of the incentives generated by ill-
conceived policies aimed at improving the lives of the disadvantaged.'
One of the great tragedies of the welfare state, as illustrated by the Social
Security and AFDC programs, is its insidious erosion of moral standards
and its destruction of the extended and nuclear family, the great vehicle
for the transmission of culture. For example, the once solid bourgeois
virtues of the Scandinavian countries are being supplanted by envy, indo-
lence, and tax evasion. In this country, the inhibition of the formation of
inner-city families and the feminization of poverty are starkly apparent.
Morality decays from within as well. The free economy can be self-
defeating to the extent that its very success erodes the cultural context
within which the market operates. Affluence has risks, among them apa-
thy, materialism, and guilt over inherited wealth. Wilhelm Roepke rec-
ognized the link between the market and its moral setting and
condemned materialism as "a disorder of spiritual perception of almost
pathological nature, a misjudgment of the true scale of vital values, a
degradation of man. . .. " Furthermore, the rise of moral relativism
since the turn of the century'0 has led many to conclude that no moral
difference exists between voluntary wealth creation and coerced political
redistribution. The moral bonds that promoted self-restraint have been
broken.
In such an economic and moral context, what do clients want from
their lawyers? Modem law practice is built on two fundamental choices.
On the one hand, in the context of the market, many clients are creating
wealth through the processes of saving, investment, and exchange. When
the market fosters real economic growth, a demand is created for legal
services associated with these transactions. Many such clients want
traditional legal services: business transactions finalized, contracts and
wills drafted, disputes settled, and debts collected. While those in busi-
ness may operate more on the basis of informal agreement than on spe-
cific rules of law and build their long-term relationships on mutual
8. See, e.g., C. MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 1950-1980 (1984).
9. W. ROEPKE, A HUMANE ECONOMY 109 (1971).
10. P. JOHNSON, MODERN TIMES 1-48 (1983).
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trust,"l the legal system provides a context for bargaining in which ex-
pectations can be assured and confidence engendered for going forward.
These familiar staples of law practice share one essential characteristic:
they are positive sum games that facilitate productive free exchange,
which in turn increases the total wealth of society. Goods and services
move to higher-valued uses. Savings are invested in tools of production
rather than used for present consumption, thereby yielding greater future
income. In this context lawyers can represent their clients with vigor,
confident that single-minded devotion to their client's cause creates
greater wealth for society.
What else do clients want? Some clients hire lawyers not because they
wish to create wealth, but rather because they hope to redistribute ex-
isting wealth from others with government and politics as the means.
These clients are similar to wealth creators because they are entrepre-
neurs of a sort, but the consequences and morality of their actions are
very different.
How is the political system utilized to redistribute wealth? The prior
discussion has focused primarily on the free economy as the principal
means for the creation of wealth and as a context for the encouragement
of moral precepts. Other markets, however, perform in the same way as
the market for goods and services but offer an opportunity to circum-
scribe that market. I refer to the markets for politics and ideas.
The market is vulnerable because the political system sets the legal
rules by which the economic system must operate. The minimal state
can and does play an essential role in the enforcement of private agree-
ments, the protection of private property and persons, and the mainte-
nance of public order. In common law countries one sees this process at
work in the law of contracts, property, and torts. The legal rules gov-
erning free exchange are not immutable, however, because enacted law is
especially subject to change. The intellectuals and journalists who traffic
in the commerce of ideas influence public opinion, and legislators re-
spond accordingly to well-organized interests. In the absence of consti-
tutional restraints, the redistributive temptation may make the pursuit of
wealth through entrepreneurial politics irresistible to political coalitions
and to intellectuals in the academy and the media. Because of this vul-
nerability, the free economy may change as a result of the smooth func-
tioning of the market for politics and the market for ideas.
Herein lies the paradox of the free economy. The political process op-
erating as a market may well provide what the consumers of governmen-
tal action want: the restriction of the market for goods and the
11. Macaulay, Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the Complexities of Contract, 11 LAW &
SOc'Y REV. 507 (1977); Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business. A Preliminary Study, 28
AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963).
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redistribution of wealth by the force of transfer legislation. It was not
meant to be this way. Our founders distrusted power profoundly and
appreciated the importance of economic growth for a commercial repub-
lic. Far from utopian, they were aware of the shortcomings of human
nature; therefore, they erected barriers to the concentration of power.
These barriers worked well enough during the nineteenth century but
have eroded in our time.
The legislator is an entrepreneur12 who rationally wants the support of
voters in order to maximize his chances for re-election. In the market for
governmental regulation, the benefits are concentrated while the costs are
diffuse. These concentrated benefits make producers, and not consumers,
intervene in the political process because for only them do the benefits of
intervention exceed the costs. For consumers to lobby against the subsidy
is irrational because the cost of such lobbying exceeds the minute benefits
to each consumer, and chronic free-rider problems encourage inaction.
As a result, the amorphous consumer interest is systematically under-
represented. Producer groups go to the legislature in pursuit of advan-
tages unattainable through competition in the market such as import
restrictions for the textile industry, price supports for farmers, low-inter-
est loans for students, and bailouts for banks with bad loans. Rational
vote-maximizing politicians respond by giving these groups exactly what
they desire in return for electoral support. Thus government grows re-
lentlessly in response to the incentives of political logic. Because the
costs are so diffuse, the victims remain unaware of the true costs of the
special interests receiving concentrated benefits.
Clients who demand redistribution and do not create wealth are play-
ing negative sum games. They wish to add to their own wealth at the
expense of other groups or individuals, typically taxpayers and consum-
ers, whose wealth is reduced. Redistribution takes many guises with a
resort to law the usual means by which economic choice is politicized
and entitlement transfers established. Robbing Peter to pay Paul is not
just a zero-sum game because when the resources expended in the pursuit
of transfers (special interest lobbying costs and legal fees are good exam-
ples) are taken into account, the process becomes a. negative sum game
with a dead-weight loss to society. To use Mancur Olson's analogy, the
game is like Peter and Paul wrestling in a china shop to see who gets
control of its fine porcelain. As a result of the struggle, much of the
porcelain is broken.
The paradox of the market is heightened by the influence of intellectu-
12. J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); M. OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965); M. OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS (1982);
R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 405-07 (2d ed. 1977); TOWARD A THEORY OF THE
RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (J. Buchanan, R. Tollison, & G. Tullock eds. 1980).
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als and journalists in the market for ideas. The market for ideas operates
in much the same way as the market for goods and has a close relation-
ship with politics because of its influence on public opinion. Intellectuals
and journalists traffic in the commerce of ideas as they write books and
columns, give lectures, and appear on television and radio. Voters, how-
ever, have a strong incentive to be uninformed on most political ques-
tions that do not directly affect their concentrated producer interest
because the cost of becoming well-informed usually exceeds the benefits.
Accordingly, many voters rely on the media and "costless" information
broadcast over the regulated broadcast spectrum and supported invisibly
by the costs of advertising borne by consumers. Unfortunately, complex
explanations, particularly those based on economics, often seem counter-
intuitive and baffling to the average person who is more comfortable with
non-spontaneous explanations that emphasize conscious planning and
manipulation. In addition, Ronald Coase has indicated that many people
are more interested in the struggle between truth and falsehood than in
the truth itself.1 3 The spread of television has popularized trite analysis
of visual images based on emotion and has displaced thoughtful reflec-
tion on the complexities conveyed by the written word.
In this context, many intellectuals and journalists are hostile toward
voluntary free markets for goods while remaining protective of their own
market for ideas. This choice is not accidental. Ambitious but averse to
the market, intellectuals tend to be visionaries who criticize the existing
(usually capitalistic) order by recourse to an aspiration toward a vague
(usually socialistic) ideal. Preoccupied by the result of equality of condi-
tion and unconcerned with wealth creation as a process, many intellectu-
als seek a society of permanence where spontaneous orders, especially the
market for goods, are restrained by force. Envious of the material re-
wards of the business world but loath or incapable of competing in free
markets, which do not recognize or reward alleged moral superiority but
instead reward those who please the subjective mass preferences of con-
sumers, these intellectuals see governmental expansion as the avenue to
wealth, power, prestige, and a lasting recognition of the status they de-
serve. As a class, critical intellectuals are made possible by the affluence
created by the economic system many of them dislike. 4 Indeed, alien-
ated egalitarian intellectuals are a luxury that can be afforded only by a
society that has not fully implemented their ideas.
While intellectuals often are hostile toward the free economy in goods,
they are strenuous advocates of their own prerogatives. They presume
government to be competent to regulate the market for goods while as-
13. Coase, The Marketplacefor Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 384, 390
(Papers & Proceedings 1974).
14. J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 145-55 (3d ed. 1976).
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serting the primacy of freedom of speech in opposing any governmental
intrusion into the untrammeled commerce in ideas. As Ronald Coase
and Aaron Director so cogently have observed, the intellectuals have
acted in their own self-interest to avoid regulation of speech as they ply
their own trade while approving the regulation of the "economic" activi-
ties of others, especially as they see themselves doing the regulating.15
By failing to perceive the relationship between economic liberty and in-
tellectual freedom, the intellectuals' support for economic regulation in-
evitably undermines their own autonomy as academics and traders in
ideas.
As a result of the disproportionate influence of these constituencies,
public perception of institutions and economic systems often lacks the
subtlety with which to overcome the redistributivist temptation.
Preventing redistribution is difficult enough when the incentives are in-
tact even if the redistributors know that the overall result is grossly ineffi-
cient and impoverishing for the society as a whole. The encouragement
of wealth creation is even more difficult when the intellectuals and the
structural flaws of democracy encourage public opinion to overlook the
very real but often diffusely invisible costs and believe that redistribution
is beneficial. In the marketplace of ideas, uncontroverted bad ideas soon
dominate.
II. REDISTRIBUTION IN PRACTICE: THE CLIENTS
Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed union,
none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break
and control the violence of faction.
James Madison,
The Federalist, No. X
Ever the realist, James Madison was familiar with the potential for the
redistribution of wealth by the abuse of politics as opposed to wealth
creation in the market. Lawyers play a crucial role in this choice because
they can market their services in the pursuit of both. Writ large, a redis-
tributive law practice is built around the transfers among members of the
middle class resulting from governmental regulation, entitlement pro-
grams, and the structural incentives of the judicial system. Unlike the
popular stereotype, the redistribution of wealth is rarely from the rich to
the poor. Regulation and subsidy often are captured by the regulated
persons or industries with government constituting the single greatest
source of monopoly in the economy. Entitlement programs usually bene-
fit the politically well-organized middle class just as the judicial system
15. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1977); Coase, supra note 13;
Director, The Parity of the Economic Market Place, 7 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1964); see also R. POSNER,
supra note 12, at 549-50.
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too often principally benefits the lawyers. Because the organization of
legal work in the practice of law follows client type as well as the doctri-
nal lines of a law school curriculum, any analysis of the lawyers' involve-
ment in redistribution should incorporate both approaches.
Accordingly, this essay argues for an approach that examines doctrine
and client type. The doctrinal line follows the conventional lines of law
school curricula from the perspective of wealth creation and begins with
contracts, the great field of civil obligation grounded on promise, which
is at the heart of the process. For this discussion contracts takes prece-
dence over property and torts, two older fields of law with feudal roots
antedating the eighteenth-century revolution in productive exchange.
Property governs the institution of private property, the presupposed ba-
sis for exchange, and torts completes the realm of civil obligation, gov-
erning the protection of the person and property from injury. In addition
are the rules of civil procedure by which civil disputes are resolved. Be-
yond these first year courses are such important themes as regulation,
antitrust, constitutional law, and jurisprudence in which redistributive
possibilities through politics loom large. The client continuum follows
size and incentives for political organization and begins with the large,
politically well-organized (usually corporate) client and ends with the po-
litically unorganized individual or small business client. Redistribution
usually is achieved outside the market by politically well-organized cli-
ents acting in concert with legislators and governmental agencies. Rarely
is redistribution a concern of the common law or of politically unorgan-
ized consumers.
Contract is capitalism. The purpose of contract law is to effectuate
exchange based on promises. Arising through assumpsit in response to
the transformation of wealth in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the
enforceability of executory promises was an enormous leap forward from
the traditional protections of tort for misfeasance. Soon wealth consisted
of more than mere land; therefore, a suitable basis for the protection of
the creative potential of the entrepreneur had to be found. As the Indus-
trial Revolution began, wealth became more abstract in the form of capi-
tal, and the protections of assumpsit encouraged risk taking. In England,
this risk taking brought about the triumph over medieval life from 1760
to 1830. Similarly, in the United States during this magnificent century,
the "years of contract" from 1800 to 1875 saw unprecedented wealth
creation. Economic historians must emphasize the legal framework
within which the creation of mass wealth began. The Law Merchant,
dating from the Middle Ages, played a helpful role in this process, both
in England and internationally.1 6 Free from the constraints of politics of
any government, the Law Merchant spontaneously grew to serve the
16. L. TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAW (1983).
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needs of trading merchants and their consumers. Business custom was
viewed as the law, and productive exchange was enhanced. Since then,
the mark of the great commercial judges, such as Lord Mansfield and
Cardozo, has been the deciding of cases in the manner of the Law
Merchant, in the light of commercial practice.
Contract governs the bargains of clients all along the line of political
organization from the large corporation to the individual. Where con-
tracts render enforceable agreements in open, competitive markets, they
are desirable means for wealth creation. Contract-based free exchange
assumes that value is subjective and thereby accords the consumer a rec-
ognition of individual choice. At the common law of contract, this pro-
cess is at work when the courts refrain from judging the adequacy of
consideration. 7 For these judges it is sufficient that the parties intended
that an exchange take place. The law of contract is ennobling for the
lawyer whose work embraces free exchange, and to the extent that open
markets result, replacing politics, redistribution is inhibited.
However, redistribution occasionally arises in contract law. At the
consumer end of the client continuum, where individual consumers are
unorganized politically, judges, in the guise of paternalism, sometimes
decide cases on redistributive grounds. These clients have not sought
redistribution in the manner of regulated industries, although their law-
yers may have been motivated by distributional concerns. The most con-
spicuous example of good intentions gone awry are the unconscionability
cases. In response to Karl Llewellyn's heroic invitation to make the bases
of decision explicit, 8 the result has been uniformly unsatisfactory. While
there may be less manipulation of doctrine for unstated ends, whether
viewed from the perspective of form 9 or substance, 20 the courts never
asked the right questions. The judges failed to examine whether the fi-
nancial devices in question served useful purposes or whether market
conditions justified high prices. Accordingly, the cases that emerged are
incoherent rationalizations that consumers can take. Uninformed by any
understanding of markets, the decisions in practice would only make life
worse for the intended beneficiaries.2 '
Because contract is so closely allied with free exchange, the attitude of
scholars toward redistribution has had a profound influence on the de-
bate over contractual obligation. The moral basis of contract in the
17. R. POSNER, supra note 12, at 71.
18. NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORT 177-78 (N.Y. LEG. Doc. No.
65, 1954).
19. E.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
20. E.g., Jones v. Star-Credit Corp., 59 Misc.2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
21. R. POSNER, supra note 12, at 87-88; Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18
J.L. & ECON. 293 (1975); Schwartz, Seller Unequal Bargaining Power and the Judicial Process, 49
IND. L.J. 367 (1974).
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promissory principle is consistent with the freedom of the individual and
the inhibition of redistribution.22 On the other hand, those sympathetic
with redistribution often embrace the argument that contract should be
absorbed into tort. The denegration of the promissory principle is consis-
tent with the preference for a collective, rather than individual, basis of
obligation.23 Even so, the redistributional consequences of common law
contract doctrines are insignificant when compared with those of the leg-
islative process.
The law of property, although older than that of contract, aids wealth
creation by providing the freely transferable property rights necessary for
exchange24 and offers enduring solutions to many troublesome policy
questions such as the allocation of scarce water.25 In short, the best way
to save any resource is to create private property rights in that resource.
Communal, socialist ownership is a guarantee of its overconsumption
and eventual destruction.
Private property rights can be the object of redistribution, however, on
behest of politically well organized clients operating outside the market.
Zoning26 and environmental regulation2 7 are conspicuous examples of
subsidy and redistribution on behalf of the middle and upper classes.
Other examples abound in the mismanagement of public lands in the
West, especially timber and grazing lands, and the subsidies given to tim-
ber companies and ranchers.28
As with contract, in property law some judges have engaged in redis-
tributive decision-making on behalf of consumers in the implied war-
ranty of habitability cases. 29 Again, as in the unconscionability cases, the
judges failed to understand the context of competitive markets. To the
extent that added costs are passed on to tenants in competitive rental
markets, good intentions go awry, and the consumers' well-being is not
22. C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981).
23. Id. at 4-5. For illustrations of the contort[ion]s of this approach, see P. ATIYAH, THE RISE
AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979) and G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT
(1974).
24. G. W. NUTrER, Markets Without Property: A Grand Illusion, in POLITICAL ECONOMY
AND FREEDOM 94-102 (1983).
25. T. ANDERSON, WATER CRISIS: ENDING THE POLICY DROUGHT (1983); Anderson, Water
Needn't Be a Fighting Word, Wall St. J., Sept. 30, 1983, at 30, col. 4.
26. B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING (1972).
27. R. ISAAC & E. ISAAC, THE COERCIVE UTOPIANS 45-83 (1983); W. TUCKER, PROGRESS
AND PRIVILEGE: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM (1982); Isaac & Isaac, Subsi-
dizing Political Hidden Agendas, Wall St. J., Sept. 6, 1984, at 28, col. 3.
28. BUREAUCRACY Vs. ENVIRONMENT: THE ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF BUREAUCRATIC
GOVERNANCE (J. Baden & R. Stroup eds. 1981); PRIVATE RIGHTS & PUBLIC LANDS (P. Truluck
ed. 1983); Baden & Stroup, Property Rights, Environmental Quality, and the Management of Na-
tional Forests, in MANAGING THE COMMONS 229 (G. Hardin & J. Baden eds. 1977); Stroup &
Baden, Externality, Property Rights, and the Management of our National Forests, 16 J.L. & ECON.
303 (1973).
29. E.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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Tort law protects the person and property from harm. Although much
debate has taken place over whether tort law fulfills purposes of justice,
compensation, or efficiency, explicit redistribution never figured promi-
nently among its purposes. In recent years, however, the incentives of
the court system and tort doctrine have generated serious redistributional
problems in products liability and personal injury cases. The decline of
the fault principle and the rise of enterprise liability reflect a redistribu-
tional agenda. The almost routine recovery of punitive damages against
corporate defendants and of extravagant amounts for pain and suffering
also is grounded on redistribution. To the extent that these trends reflect
the manipulative skills of plaintiffs' trial lawyers, they are a commentary
on the deficiencies of the adversarial system. Should these trends repre-
sent a change in judicial and public attitudes toward risk, corporations,
and physicians, disturbing questions are raised about the formation of
public opinion, especially the influence of anti-business, egalitarian media
and intellectual elites. Plaintiffs' trial lawyers are responding to the in-
centives of the contingency fee system and encouraging juries to award
damages based on envy of those with so-called "deep pockets." Because
corporations usually are owned by many shareholders, often through
pension funds, and because consumers ultimately bear the costs of doing
business, these extravagant awards are not paid by some mythical
wealthy class, although such an image is convenient for use by litigators
with a vested interest in the size of the award.
Traditionally, the rules of civil procedure have been used for the settle-
ment of disputes between private parties. The lawsuit was controlled by
the parties, and the judge was the neutral umpire. Under this approach,
the rules were in keeping with the traditional distinction between adjudi-
cation and legislation and were not available for the active promotion of
redistribution. Increasingly, however, building upon the equitable prin-
ciples of mandamus and mandatory injunctions, the rules of civil proce-
dure are being used for prospective political change of public institutions
under the label of "public law litigation."3 In these cases, the impetus
for redistribution comes at the behest of either ideological plaintiffs or
lawyers working with nominal plaintiffs. Accordingly, any discussion of
the new civil procedure should be part of a later discussion of the lawyer
as entrepreneur.
Much redistribution comes in the guise of governmental regulation,
and lawyers help their clients attain and keep these subsidies. On the
federal level, regulatory practice clusters about the familiar alphabet
30. R. POSNER, supra note 12, at 356-61.
31. See, e.g., Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281
(1976).
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soup of agencies such as the ICC, FTC, FCC, and SEC as well as such
departments as Agriculture and Interior. The cost of regulation exceeds
the benefits and amounts to a redistribution from unorganized interests,
often consumers, to the better organized interests. Furthermore, legal
fees paid to lawyers who are advocating redistribution is social waste.
Admittedly, since 1980, a desirable cutback of agency excess32 and one
unparalleled example of agency termination33 have taken place. How-
ever, the political structures fostering incentives for subsidy and redistri-
bution largely have remained intact. On the state and local level, lawyers
congregate before political redistributors such as zoning boards, milk
commissions, and innumerable licensing boards.34 To the extent that
transfer activity supplants the creation of wealth, lawyers will have an
incentive to become another constituency of redistribution. This trans-
formation is particularly deplorable given the increased demand for legal
services that could result from an increase in the total wealth of society.
In antitrust law, the debate centers on the purpose of the statutes.
Were they aimed at promoting the efficiency of the market and consumer
welfare, or were they enacted with a redistributive intent? Even in the
absence of a redistributional intent, enforcement policy has shifted with
changes in administration, and redistribution has made an impact. The
more compelling argument justifies antitrust law solely on the promotion
of consumer welfare, a goal attainable only through open, competitive
markets and not through redistribution.35
Do lawyers have an ethical obligation to inform their clients of the
economic and moral consequences of redistribution? The Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, adopted by the American Bar Association in
1983, do not require such action. However, a lawyer is authorized to
inform the clients of the law and "other considerations such as moral,
economic, social and political factors that may be relevant to the client's
32. Three examples readily come to mind. Since 1980 the Federal Trade Commission has em-
ployed greater economic analysis and curtailed its rulemaking proceedings. See Muris, Rules With-
out Reason: The Case of the FTC, Regulation, Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 21. In addition, the Commission
has reformulated its standard for evaluation of deceptive trade practices under § 5 of the FTC Act.
FTC Alters Its Policy on Deceptive Ads by 3-2 Vote, Sparks Congressional Outcry, Wall St. J., Oct. 24,
1983, at 41, col. 1. For a discussion critical of the new standard, see Bailey & Pertschuk, The Law of
Deception: The Past as Prologue, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 849 (1984). The record of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission has been mixed. Moore, Rail and Truck Reform - The Record So Far, Regula-
tion, Nov.-Dec. 1983, at 33. The Federal Communications Commission has pursued a vigorous
agenda of deregulation. Mark Fowler, FCC's apostle of deregulation, Wash. Times, Feb. 7, 1985, at
7B, col. 2.
33. The Civil Aeronautics Board was abolished Jan. 1, 1985 following the emergence of a broad
bipartisan coalition critical of the costs of regulation. For a discussion of the CAB's earlier carteliza-
tion of the airlines, see R. MCKENZIE & G. TULLOCK, THE NEW WORLD OF ECONOMICS: EXPLO-
RATIONS INTO THE HUMAN EXPERIENCE 249-51 (3d ed. 1981).
34. For trenchant criticism of these state and local restraints, see W. WILLIAMS, supra note 4,
at 67-123.
35. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978); R. POSNER, supra note 12, at 211-37.
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situation. '"36 This position derives from an earlier ethical consideration
under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.37 The format of
the Model Rules arguably places greater emphasis on evaluation of the
consequences of client preferences because the standard is placed in the
black-letter portion in Restatement style rather than in an ethical consid-
eration as in the Model Code. However, because the standard is merely
permissive, even the black letter of the Model Rules is no restraint on
redistribution. With lawyers taking a client's preferences largely as a
given, this neutrality reinforces the attitude that people should use their
political influence to transfer wealth. Indeed, lawyers who persistently
advise their subsidy-seeking clients to eschew politics and to compete in
the market likely will lose those clients.
III. REDISTRIBUTION IN PRACTICE: THE LAWYERS
Clients are not the only people adept at redistribution. Some lawyers
now seek to redistribute wealth directly to themselves. This development
stems from the incentives of the adversarial trial system as well as from
direct awards of fees. In addition, redistribution is motivated by radical
ideology in some cases.
Should the court system be, available at minimal or no cost to litigants?
Just as a zero price creates unlimited demand and encourages overuse
and destruction of such things as public parks,38 so does a subsidy of
parties to a lawsuit lower their costs and encourage litigation. Those
who are able to pay user fees should do so, and such fees should be suffi-
ciently high to reflect actual costs and discourage nuisance suits.39 In
addition, the threshold jurisdictional amount for access to the federal
courts should be raised significantly.' Private courts and arbitration
provide a desirable market alternative to the present tax-supported sys-
tem. Like any private firm, private dispute settlement firms would have
every incentive to be fair and impartial. In addition, they would develop
specialized expertise in business practices so that, like the merchant juries
of Lord Mansfield's court, they could decide the cases in light of com-
mercial practice. Finally, in order to invite reflection on the merits of a
potential plaintiffs claim, losers should be required to pay the court costs
and legal fees of the prevailing party.4 1
Direct payments to lawyers are a relatively recent development. Ever
36. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1983).
37. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1983).
38. Beckwith, Parks, Property Rights, and the Possibilities of the Private Law, 1 CATO J. 473
(1981).
39. Crovitz, Lawyers on Trial, 35 POL'y REV. 72, 74 (1986); Settling Out of Court, Wall St. J.,
Aug. 22, 1985, at 22, col. 1.
40. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 252 (1985).
41. Crovitz, supra note 39, at 73-74.
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since the federal government began awarding attorneys' fees to successful
litigants, entrepreneurial lawyers have done well in collecting fees from
the taxpayer.12 Particularly offensive have been the large settlements of
class action suits such as the Agent Orange litigation. 3 Such settlements
are redistributive to the extent that they reflect the enhanced nuisance
value of frivolous suits in the context of media influence on opinion. Ju-
rors are not immune from the redistributive influence of intellectual fash-
ion, and the awards in tort cases as well as jurors' statements following
the verdict in the highly publicized murder trial of Jack Henry Abbott,
the cause celebre of New York intellectuals," do not augur well for the
integrity of the jury system.
One of the more startling developments for entrepreneurial lawyers is
called public law litigation, or, more accurately, substantive civil proce-
dure. 5 Unlike the traditional lawsuit with its focus on specific aggrieved
clients, the new civil procedure focuses on changes in the operation of
public institutions at the behest of lawyers and ideological plaintiffs. Pre-
cise measurement of the redistributive impetus for these lawsuits is diffi-
cult, but a few preliminary observations are in order. The object of these
lawsuits is the vindication of constitutional or statutory policies, and they
often reflect "skepticism about the existing distribution of power and
privilege in American society."46 These lawsuits result in judges assum-
ing essentially legislative power with on-going responsibilities for super-
vision of societal institutions. What are these policies? To the extent
that they reflect entitlements from government rather than traditional
immunities from its coercive power, these lawsuits are redistributive.
For example, their origin in social security entitlements, environmental
regulation, and the new equal protection jurisprudence is especially vul-
nerable to criticism.
Redistributive law practice can be funded by the state. The unhappy
history of several agencies funded by the Legal Services Corporation
[LSC] is an example of politicization by radical lawyers to achieve a so-
cialist agenda for the redistribution of wealth. The Legal Services Corpo-
ration was established to provide routine legal assistance to the poor but
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982 & Supp. 1983). Although named the Civil Rights Attorneys
Fees Award Act, § 1988 has been construed to have a very broad reach. See Lawyers on the Dole,
Wall St. J., Sept. 8, 1982, at 32, col. 1; Caught in the Act, Wall St. J., Oct. 31, 1980, at 28, col. 1;
43. Champerty, Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 1984, at 28, col. i.
44. The jurors, conscious of their status as celebrities and of the support for Abbott among
literary figures, discussed their belief that society rather than the individual is responsible for crime.
Was their response in keeping with their celebrity status and the "expected" response that no one
should be held individually accountable? See Rabinowitz, Jack Henry Abbott: The Verdict Was
Manslaughter, Wall St. J., Jan. 29, 1982, at 28, col. 3.
45. See G. McDOWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THE-
ORY 29-34 (1985).
46. Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication, in How DOES THE CONSTITU-
TION SECURE RIGHTS? 8 (R. Goldwin & W. Schambra eds. 1985).
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some of its constituent agencies exceeded this mandate. Class action
suits were filed taking broad policy positions on topics ranging from In-
dian land claims to opposition to nuclear power. Large portions of LSC
staff time and budget were consumed by these class actions.47 In addi-
tion, following the 1980 election, LSC officials diverted funds and staff
time into a so-called "survival campaign."4 Further, in December 1982,
allegations of excessive fees by new appointees were made by sympathetic
media. These unfounded allegations diverted attention from scrutiny of
a continuing resolution to fund the agency for two years, thus effectively
blocking reform by the then active board.49 These examples from the
history of the LSC illustrate that the impetus for redistribution did not
derive from the clients, who typically want routine services such as a
divorce or help in resolving differences with a landlord. Instead, the law-
yers' ideology determined the commitment to radical redistribution and
involvement in politics. The influence of the National Lawyers Guild in
radicalizing some agencies funded by the LSC is undisputed.5" This in-
fluence parallels its involvement in the Critical Legal Studies
movement. 51
The curricula of the law schools have responded to shifting client pref-
erences and the inclinations of the professors. After the Langdellian
case-method revolution at Harvard in 1870, the birth of redistribution
through regulation spawned courses in economic regulation, antitrust,
labor law, and administrative law. In recent years, courses in social wel-
fare legislation, complex litigation, and environmental law have devel-
oped. Older courses, such as constitutional law and taxation, have been
affected greatly by the sweeping tide of egalitarianism and judicial activ-
ism in our time. Indeed, a study of the evolution of these course offerings
would illustrate graphically the paradox of the market and the rise of
redistribution in an atmosphere devoid of self-restraint and inhibiting
democratic procedures and constitutional interpretations.
Since the 1930's, these curriculum patterns of redistribution have been
paralleled by a change in outlook, first among many law professors and
now among many judges, as to what judges should do. The Realist
Movement brought an end to the formal, doctrinal jurisprudence of the
47. R. ISAAC & E. ISAAC, supra note 27, at 234-43; Not So Legal Services, Wall St. J., Oct. 4,
1985, at 20, col. 1; Isaac & Isaac, Subsidizing Political Hidden Agendas, Wall St. J., Sept. 6, 1984, at
28, col. 3.
48. Kucewicz, A Little Larceny in Legal Services?, Wall St. J., Aug. 19, 1983, at 18, col. 4.
49. Id.; Press held 'used' in Legal Services ploy, Wash. Times, Aug. 4, 1983, at 2A, col. 2; Video
reveals Legal Services Corp. drew 'survival plans', Wash. Times, July 28, 1983, at 4A, col. i; Misuse of
legal aid fund revealed, Wash. Times, July 12, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
50. R. ISAAC & E. ISAAC, supra note 27, at 237-40.
51. The Guild co-sponsored the first volume of Critical Legal Studies essays in 1977 following
the first Critical Legal Studies meeting. See THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 7
(D. Kairys ed. 1982).
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late nineteenth century. 2 In their varied voices, the realists said that the
rules at law do not always explain the results at law. At its core, realism
asserts that judges draw on their life experiences to consider the "two
becauses" of every case, the doctrine of the prior cases and the policy
justification underlying the rule that emerges from those cases. In subse-
quent cases the great judge, who is disciplined by the judicial role, would,
within the leeways of precedent, follow the sense of the situation, carving
out appropriate exceptions for compelling equities particular to the ques-
tion for decision.
5 3
In the absence of a directly applicable statute or constitutional provi-
sion, a modest realism in the development of common law cases can be
helpful. Such realism recognizes the humanity of the judge who, con-
fined by the judicial role, can evaluate whether the initial policy justifica-
tion of a particular rule extracted from the cases supports the rule's
extension by analogy in a new situation. The rejection of mechanical
jurisprudence does not, however, mean the absence of constraints. In
particular, an aversion to the reification of ideas does not imply approval
of the judicial exercise of legislative power. This judgment is a matter of
degree just as the modest realist finds sufficient reckonability within the
leeways of precedent to recognize that this lack of certainty in the appel-
late courts is an invitation for craftsmanship and not a reason for the
despair of nihilism.
Realism was destructive, however. By bringing an end to formal rule-
oriented analysis, the realists opened the way for their more extreme dis-
ciples to bring an end to the judicial function in a manner reminiscent of
Keynes' disciples bringing perpetual deficits in a way he never contem-
plated. Just how destructive the disciples of realism have been we now
know as we contemplate the wreckage of constitutional law and the dis-
aster of socialist thought in the law schools, especially the excesses of
Critical Legal Studies.
IV. REDISTRIBUTION IN THEORY I: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Constitutional law is in crisis, and the outcome of the present debate
will determine whether constitutional law will, in fact, be constitutional
law at all. The questions seem disarmingly simple: to what extent shall a
sitting judge be bound by the written text and ascertainable intent of the
framers of the Constitution? Can history be known with sufficient clarity
to guide the judge? The debate centers on the choice between interpretiv-
ism, which looks primarily to the text of the Constitution and the intent
of the framers, and noninterpretivism, which looks primarily outside the
52. See, e.g., Gilmore, Book Review, 60 YALE L.J. 1251 (1951).
53. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 1-157 (1960).
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text and history to the moral values of the judges and the law professors.
Those who believe that the historic intention can and should guide the
judge face a critical task of restoration to insure that interpretivism is
once more the dominant mode of constitutional discourse.
Constitutions, if they are to survive, must grow, rooted in the experi-
ence and timeless norms of a people. They cannot successfully be poured
on from the top as inventions out of abstraction. As stated by Judge
Robert Bork, that most graceful of interpretivists:
Our constitutional liberties arose out of historical experience and out of
political, moral, and religious sentiment. They do not rest upon any gen-
eral theory. Attempts to frame a theory that removes from democratic
control areas of life the framers intended to leave there can only succeed
if abstractions are regarded as overriding the constitutional text and
structure, judicial precedent, and the history that gives our rights life,
rootedness, and meaning.
54
These permanent things, the experienced norms and the earthy rooted-
ness of the historic Constitution contrast vividly with the gossamer webs
of moral philosophy and other ephemeral sources of noninterpretivism.
The theories of noninterpretivism are increasingly abstract and philo-
sophical, divorced from the practical wisdom that was the style of earlier
constitutional analysis. 5 In addition, the professors who advocate
noninterpretivism are much more permissive and egalitarian than either
the historic Constitution or the American people as a whole.56 Thus
when the original intention is no longer the sole legitimate premise for
constitutional analysis, this outlook becomes the substance of the Consti-
tution. Such a pursuit of permissive, egalitarian abstraction can only dis-
solve into coercion and a loss of freedom.
One recent historical example shows how dangerous the pursuit of
ahistorical abstraction can be. In 1975, following the overthrow of the
Cambodian government, the Khmer Rouge began to relentlessly trans-
form Cambodia in accord with an abstract socialist idea unrelated to
Cambodian history or the cultural experience of its people.5 7 These ac-
tions were accomplished at the behest of a small group of intellectuals
trained on a mixture of Proudhon and Marx at the Sorbonne. They were
"pure intellectuals" who praised the theoretical virtues of rural life and,
like many intellectuals hostile toward capitalism, despised commerce and
54. R. BORK, TRADITION AND MORALITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 8 (Am. Enter. Inst.
1984).
55. Bork, Foreword to G. McDOWELL, supra note 45, at vi (1985). For a lucid discussion of
the weaknesses of noninterpretivism, see Kurland, Curia Regi. Some Comments on the Divine Right
of Kings and Courts "to Say What the Law Is", 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 581 (1981).
56. Bork, supra note 55, at vii; Bork, The Struggle Over the Court, Nat'l Rev., Sept. 17, 1982, at
1137.
57. Conversation with Chhang Song, former Cambodian Minister of Information and former
president of the Association of Cambodian Journalists (Jan. 27, 1979).
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cities. Predictably, "none of them had ever engaged in manual labor or
had any experience at all of creating wealth.""8 These intellectuals inten-
tionally sought to obliterate the past and create a new society based
solely on theoretical foundations. The result was an episode of unspeak-
able cruelty and barbarism. As Phnom Penh was emptied and its citi-
zens scattered into the countryside, the killings began, and before the
violence ended, two million people were dead.
My contrast of noninterpretivism with the Cambodian revolution or
the French, from which it derived, is intentional. The similarity of their
modes of thought is striking and unavoidable. Hardly an ad hominem
ploy, this parallel between noninterpretivism and the Cambodian geno-
cide should give pause to any thoughtful noninterpretivist as a reminder
of how easily the pursuit of ahistorical egalitarian abstraction degener-
ates into political coercion.
Constitutional law is linked closely to redistribution. The choice be-
tween interpretivism and noninterpretivism is, in fact, a choice between
the inhibition and the encouragement of redistribution. Those who look
to the text and original intent are beginning with eighteenth-century re-
publicanism. To the framers, sin and self-interest were very real and they
had no illusions about the malleability or perfectibility of persons. Con-
stitutional limitations were meant to restrain these natural tendencies.
The genius of American constitutionalism stems from its inhibition of
envy and redistribution and its channeling of private vice into public vir-
tue. A restoration of the original intention would inhibit redistribution."9
On the other hand, those who look first to the ahistorical moral values of
the judges are looking at the relentlessly egalitarian and redistributive
values of the professors who purport to instruct them.
Using the methods of a modest realism, one must ask whether the
rules of constitutional adjudication explain the choices made by the
professors. Does the choice of method conceal an unstated prior choice
of desired result? To their credit, the interpretivists have honesty on
their side because they do not defend a judge using conservative or liber-
tarian moral values divorced from the text and the claims of history. Do
the noninterpretivists believe in their method, or do they embrace
noninterpretivism because they have no history to call their own? After
all, the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 was not the Paris Commune.
Does their self-consciousness and prolix embarassment reveal a funda-
mental awareness of their own illegitimacy and a desire to conceal that
only their dislike of the history they find causes them to reject history's
claims?
58. P. JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 155.
59. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT Do-
MAIN (1985).
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The noninterpretivist constitutional law scholars are at risk. Judge
Bork bluntly states that "legitimate non-interpretivism is like the perpet-
ual motion machine-nobody is going to make it work."'  In their quest
for power and authority, for which they have no constitutional warrant,
the professors, like the proverbial emperor, wear no clothes. Only the
isolation of legal culture and the lingering deference given the status of
the professors' offices in the law schools explain the durability of their
pretense. The professors will quickly exhaust their residual good will
should the people come to understand the consequences of
noninterpretivism.
V. REDISTRIBUTION IN THEORY II: THE LAW PROFESSORS AND
THE DISASTER OF SOCIALIST THOUGHT
Traditionally, law teachers have been more conservative than profes-
sors generally, especially when compared with the more radical disci-
plines such as sociology.6" In recent years, the influence of socialist
thought has been on the increase in the law schools, primarily under the
umbrella of Critical Legal Studies [CLS]. This change is attributable to
increasingly interdisciplinary approaches to legal scholarship62 as well as
the political outlook of the generation of law teachers now on the thresh-
old of middle age. While generalizations are difficult, some aspects of
this newest manifestation of socialist thought warrant attention.
The war of some in CLS against the rich6 3 is puzzling and resembles
the fear of statistical presentations of both corporate market share and
income differences. In each case, critics assume that the results are static
and reflect a distribution that is unchanging over time. In the absence of
governmental protection, when competitive firms survive, their market
shares reflect the ability to weather the creative destruction of innova-
tion.' Many firms with large market shares are displaced over time by
other firms more responsive to the changing preferences of consumers.
Firms must evolve or perish, and firms with obsolete technologies (e.g.,
whale oil and candles for lamps, steam locomotives, natural fibers before
synthetics) disappear. Static, one-time statistical measures of market
share fail to capture the complexity of causation or evolution over time.
The rich are recycled like firms, and only the competitive survive. Unless
the rich create wealth, they will exhaust their capital and become middle
class. Great entrepreneurial fortunes often are divided among growing
60. Bork, supra note 55, at ix.
61. E. LADD & S. LIPSET, THE DIVIDED ACADEMY: PROFESSORS AND POLITICS 55-92 (1976).
62. Glazer, Marxism and the Law School: A Nonlegal Perspective, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
249, 253 (1985).
63. See, e.g., Kennedy, Positive and Normative Elements in Legal Education: A Response, 8
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 263, 266 (1985).
64. J. SCHUMPETER, supra note 14, at 81-86.
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numbers of descendants who frequently lack either the aptitude or atti-
tude needed to make money. Indeed, the pejorative term nouveau riche is
a sign of health and vigor in a free economy. The very newness of their
wealth illustrates the emptiness of statistical measures of wealth
disparities.
A preoccupation with antecedent endowment of what is already pro-
duced obscures wealth creation as a process. What matters is process,
not result. The only requirement is competitive markets with free entry
for all. Then new wealth is created and is not extracted at someone's
expense. The morality of the distribution of earned rewards is a question
of means judged prospectively. Those who do not create new wealth and
take from others by redistribution are morally reprehensible. Further,
the misconception that wealth is extracted from a fixed quantity rather
than created leads to the erroneous conclusion that groups are entitled to
"shares" of wealth without regard to whether these groups have contrib-
uted to its creation.65
Those in CLS who decry the alleged power of some to reduce others to
"dependence" in large-scale private organizations forget that in competi-
tive markets dependence is mutual. No critic ever mentions the depen-
dence of the employer forced to pay competitive wage rates to obtain
workers or the landlord unable to charge more than the competitive
rental rate to obtain tenants. Furthermore, these critics face the impossi-
ble task of proving, contrary to a century of experience, that socialist
alternatives will not generate the most oppressive tyrannies resulting
from the centralization of political power. How else can they explain the
lack of symmetry between a free and a socialist society? Some people
fear freedom and responsibility. So be it, because in a free society mass
man easily can live a life of unity and security in private collectives such
as a monastery, kibbutz, or utopian community. On the other hand, for
the individual who cherishes autonomy, to live as an individual within a
socialist society is nearly impossible. Where is she to go, and what is to
insulate her from the reach of the state?
The free economy and our original constitutional intention often are
accepted or rejected in tandem. This parallel between alienation from
the market and acceptance of noninterpretivism is in keeping with a pref-
erence for specific results over process, whether in the form of free ex-
change or elections. Not surprisingly, the author of the anti-market
decisions in Walker-Thomas66 and Javins67 is a caustic noninterpre-
65. Bauer, supra note 5, at 12.
66. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See supra text
accompanying note 19.
67. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. 1970). See supra text accompany-
ing note 29.
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tivist.6 s Despite any good intentions, the practices of the socialist
noninterpretivist deprive the average person of options. Participating in
an exercise in the rhetoric of power, the radical noninterpretivist would
deny free choice to consumers and voters alike in a socialist society that
would in all likelihood be run by judges instructed by law professors.
The law schools have suffered as a result. Law students too rarely are
studying the ennobling constraints on the power of the state. Instead,
they increasingly are being trained in the uses of that power.69 The un-
civil behavior of some CLS publicists has achieved wide notoriety,7" and
the more extreme CLS nihilists have been invited to leave law teaching
for other disciplines.7
Schumpeter was right. Capitalism would not be capitalism if it had
not created this class of critical intellectuals, tenured, pampered, free to
pursue their ideas in the freedom, affluence, and security of the West.
That their private demons generate such destructive externalities in the
law schools is deplorable.
VI. TOWARD A RENEWAL- OF DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY
What is to be done to inhibit redistribution and restore democratic
legitimacy? While ideas have consequences, ideas are competitive and
vigorous effort is required to argue against and prevail over socialist
thought. Furthermore, we must be realistic in assessing the likelihood of
meaningful change in light of present political realities. In the realm of
ideas, the intellectual errors of the opponents of the open society must be
demonstrated. We must offer a just moral vision of democratic legiti-
macy to capture the imagination of the uncommitted. The socialists have
been successful largely because they have argued in moral terms. Unwill-
ing to learn from experience any lessons as to the actual practice of so-
cialism, many socialists rely upon the superficial attraction of a pleasing
moral vision to which many, especially intellectuals, readily aspire. This
morally attractive aspiration gives the socialists much of their power, and
once their program has been implemented and the terrible truth of social-
ist practice becomes known, the drift toward a redistributive subsistence
economy and the collapse of democracy may be irreversible.
The friends of the free economy and democratic legitimacy must take
the cultural offensive in a broad-based moral and utilitarian celebration
68. Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 769 (1971).
69. Troy, Learning the Law at Harvard, Wall St. J., Aug. 6, 1982, at 14, col. 4.
70. Menard, Radicalism For Yuppies, The New Republic, March 17, 1986 at 20; Eastland,
Radicals in the Law Schools, Wall St. J., Jan. 10, 1986, at 16, col. 4; Kamen, War Between Professors
Pervades Harvard Law, Wash. Post, Dec. 21, 1985, at A3, col. 1. For a bibliography of CLS litera-
ture, see Kennedy & Clare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 Yale L.J. 461 (1984).
71. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEG. ED. 222 (1984).
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of the open society. We are opposing an irreconcilable adversarial cul-
ture that must be exposed as morally reprehensible and materially im-
poverishing. We must restore faith and confidence in a sweeping,
spontaneous vision of history that inspires the individual to participate
willingly, taking advantage of opportunities as they arise, free of the
myths of determinism. The individual must have confidence that decen-
tralized, spontaneous institutions such as the market, the whole of which
he cannot comprehend and whose operation is indirect, will produce a
just society of ordered liberty. We must build the faith that obviates the
need for asking why a free society functions as the result of human action
but not of human design. The creators of wealth, especially the entrepre-
neurs, must be convinced of their own virtues and encouraged to respond
to and overcome the misrepresentations and distortions of the verbal
class. Most importantly, the creators of wealth in open, competitive
markets must never suffer guilt about the wealth they have earned.
Theirs is the just reward for the service of consumers and superior en-
trepreneurial anticipation of the market. Having extracted nothing from
others, they are the innovative builders of our society, and must never
internalize the negative images spread by intellectuals, journalists, and
the purveyors of popular entertainment.
Are ideas enough? What impact will ideas have on those who benefit
from redistribution? The beneficiaries of special interest politics are not
likely to surrender willingly their subsidies even if they know that an end
to redistribution would benefit the society as a whole. A humane polit-
ical economy is needed, nourished by interpretivist constitutional theory
to implement the framers' intentions in today's world. With the renunci-
ation of noninterpretivist judicial power, however, must come meaning-
ful reform to restrain the legislative branch. Structural impediments must
be erected to alter the incentives of democratic politics to lower the pay-
off and raise the costs of special interest subsidies. Reforms such as the
line-item veto and a constitutional limit to government spending7" offer
viable opportunities for solving the riddle of democratic governance.
More than faith in the workings of the secular world is needed. We
are linked to the transcendent and what T.S. Eliot called the permanent
things. We must remember our history and the intent of the founders as
an exercise in the moral imagination. By knowing from whence we
come, we join a community of witnesses who are part of us and all that
we do and all that we are. We learn the moral lessons of history and gain
that uniquely Anglo-American common-sense wisdom based on centu-
ries of experience. With faith in our Creator, confidence in ourselves,
and fidelity to our bonds to the past, human creativity will be unleashed,
and a virtuous and rich civilization engendered. Guided by a just vision,
72. Bork, Would a Budget Amendment Work?, Wall St. J., April 4, 1979, at 20, col. 4.
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we must persevere into the unknown in the sure and certain knowledge
that we are the living embodiment of a society that is democratically
legitimate, materially enriching, and spiritually uplifting.
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